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INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES
OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.*
MICHELE TARUFFO**
ROLF STÜRNER***
ANTONIO GIDI****
I.

INTERNATIONAL “HARMONIZATION”

OF

PROCEDURAL LAW

The human community of the world lives in closer
quarters today than in earlier times. International trade is at
an all-time high and is increasing steadily; international investment and monetary flows increase apace; businesses from the
developed countries establish themselves all over the globe directly or through subsidiaries; business people travel abroad as
a matter of routine; ordinary citizens in increasing numbers
live temporarily or permanently outside their native countries.
As a consequence, there are positive and productive interactions among citizens of different nations in the form of increased commerce and wider possibilities for personal experience and development. There are also inevitable negative interactions, however, including increased social friction, legal
controversy, and litigation.
In dealing with these negative consequences, the costs
and distress resulting from legal conflict can be mitigated by
reducing differences in legal systems, so that the same or similar “rules of the game” apply no matter where the participants
may find themselves. The effort to reduce differences among
national legal systems is commonly referred to as “harmoniza* Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania, Co-Reporter for
the American Law Institute/UNIDROIT project for Principles and Rules of
Transnational Civil Procedure.
** Professor of Law, University of Pavia, Italy, Co-Reporter for the American Law Institute project for Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil
Procedure.
*** Professor of Law, University of Freiburg, Germany, Co-Reporter for
the UNIDROIT project for Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure.
**** Lecturer-in-Law, University of Pennsylvania, Assistant Reporter for
the American Law Institute project for Principles and Rules of Transnational
Civil Procedure and Secretary to the UNIDROIT Working Group.
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tion.” Another method for reducing differences is “approximation,” meaning the process of reforming the rules of various legal systems so that they approximate each other. Most
endeavors at harmonization have addressed substantive law,
particularly the law governing commercial and financial transactions. There is now in place a profusion of treaties and conventions governing these subjects as well as similar arrangements addressing personal rights such as those of employees,
children, and married women.1
Harmonization of procedural law has made much less
progress. It has been impeded by the assumption that national procedural systems are too different from each other
and too deeply embedded in local political history and cultural tradition to permit reduction or reconciliation of differences among legal systems. There are, to be sure, some international conventions dealing with procedural law, notably the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, the
evolving Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments,
and the European conventions on recognition of judgments.2
Thus far, the international conventions on procedural law
have addressed the bases of personal jurisdiction and the
mechanics for service of process to commence a lawsuit on
1. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989,
28 I.L.M. 1448; United States-Egypt Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, September 29, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
927; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, December 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
2. See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 8 I.L.M. 37; Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2001); Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413;
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 620. See also, e.g., Catherine Kessedjian, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Preliminary Document No. 7, Hague Conference on Private International Law, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/
jdgm.html (April 1997).
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one end of the litigation process and recognition of judgments
on the other end of the process.
However, the pioneering work of Professor Marcel
Storme has demonstrated that harmonization is possible in
such procedural matters as the formulation of claims, the development of evidence, and the decision procedure.3 This
project to develop transnational rules for civil procedure has
drawn extensively on the work of Professor Storme.
International arbitration often is a substitute for adjudication in national courts. However, the international conventions on arbitration have the same limited scope as the conventions dealing with international litigation in judicial forums. Thus, the international conventions on arbitration
address aspects of the commencement of an arbitration proceeding and the recognition to be accorded an arbitration
award but say little or nothing about the procedure in an international arbitration proceeding as such.4 Instead, the typical
stipulation concerning hearing procedure in international arbitration is that the procedural ground rules shall be as determined by the neutral arbitrator.5
This project endeavors to draft procedural rules that a
country could adopt for adjudication of disputes arising from
international transactions.6 The project is inspired by the desire to unite many diverse jurisdictions under one system of
procedural rules as was accomplished in the United States a
half-century ago with the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules established a single procedure to be employed in courts sitting in forty-eight different,
semi-sovereign states, each of which with its own procedural
law, its own procedural culture, and its own bar. The Federal
3. See generally APPROXIMATION OF JUDICIARY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION (Marcel Storme ed., 1994). See also Anteproyecto del Codigo Procesal Civil
Modelo para Iberoamerica, 52 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 134 (1988); Anteproyecto del
Codigo Procesal Civil Modelo para Iberoamerica 53 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 143
(1989).
4. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
5. See Alan S. Rau and Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in
International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 90 (1995).
6. See John J. Barceló III, Introduction to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo, Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules and Commentary, 30
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 493-94 (1997).
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Rules thereby accomplished what many thoughtful observers
thought impossible—a single system of procedure for four
dozen different legal communities. Experience with the Federal Rules proves that it has been possible to establish a single
procedure for litigation in Louisiana (civil law system), Virginia (common law pleading in 1938), and California (code
pleading). The project to establish Transnational Rules conjectures that a procedure for litigation in transactions across
national boundaries is also worth the attempt.
II.

FUNDAMENTAL SIMILARITIES

IN

PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS

In undertaking international harmonization of procedural law, the Reporters have come to identify both fundamental
similarities and fundamental differences among procedural
systems. Obviously, it is the fundamental differences that present the difficulties. However, it is important to keep in mind
that all modern systems of civil procedure have fundamental
similarities. These similarities result from the fact that a procedural system must respond to several inherent requirements.
Recognition of these requirements makes easier the task of
identifying functional similarities in diverse legal systems and,
at the same time, puts into sharper perspective the ways in
which procedural systems differ from one another.
The fundamental similarities among procedural systems
can be summarized as follows:
• Standards governing assertion of personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction,
• Specifications for a neutral adjudicator,
• Procedure for notice to defendant,
• Rules for formulation of claims,
• Explication of applicable substantive law,
• Establishment of facts through proof,
• Provision for expert testimony,
• Rules for deliberation, decision, and appellate review, and
• Rules of finality of judgments.
Of these, the rules of jurisdiction, notice, and recognition
of judgments are sufficiently similar from one country to another that they have been susceptible to substantial resolution
through international conventions. Concerning jurisdiction,
the United States is aberrant in that it has an expansive con-
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cept of “long-arm” jurisdiction, although this difference is one
of degree rather than one of kind, and that it perpetuates jurisdiction based on simple presence of the person (“tag” jurisdiction). Specification of a neutral adjudicator begins with realization that all legal systems have rules to assure that a judge
or other adjudicator is disinterested. Accordingly, in transnational litigation, reliance generally can be placed on the local
rules expressing that principle. Similarly, an adjudicative system by definition requires a principle of finality. Therefore,
the concept of “final” judgment generally is recognized, although some legal systems permit the reopening of a determination more liberally than other systems do. The corollary
concept of mutual recognition of judgments is also universally
accepted.
III.

DIFFERENCES AMONG PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS

The differences in procedural systems are, along one division, differences between the common law systems and the
civil law systems. The common law systems all derive from England and include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, and the United States, as well as Israel, Singapore,
and Bermuda. The civil law systems originated on the European continent and include those derived from Roman law
(the law of the Roman Empire codified in the Justinian Code)
and canon law (the law of the Roman Catholic Church, itself
substantially derived from Roman law). The civil law systems
include those of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and virtually all
other European countries, as well as those of Latin America,
Japan, and China, whose legal systems are derived from the
European model.
The significant differences between common law and civil
law systems are as follows:
• The judge in civil law systems, rather than the advocates as in common law systems, has responsibility for development of the evidence and articulation of the legal concepts that should govern a decision. However, there is great variance among
civil law systems in the manner and degree to
which this responsibility is exercised, and there is,
no doubt, variance among the judges in any given
system.
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Civil law litigation in many systems proceeds
through a series of short hearing sessions—sometimes less than an hour each—for reception of evidence, which is then consigned to the case file
pending a final stage of analysis and decision. In
contrast, common law litigation has a preliminary
or pre-trial stage (sometimes more than one), and
then a trial at which all the evidence is received
consecutively.
• A civil law judgment in the court of first instance
(i.e., trial court) is generally subject to more
searching reexamination in the court of second
instance (i.e., appellate court) than a common
law judgment. Re-examination in the civil law systems extends to facts as well as law.
• The judges in civil law systems serve a professional
lifetime as judge, whereas the judges in common
law systems are almost entirely selected from the
ranks of the bar. Thus, civil law judges lack the
experience of having been lawyers.
These are important differences, but they are not irreconcilable.
The American version of the common law system has differences from other common law systems that are of at least
equal significance. The American system is unique in the following respects:
• Jury trial is a broadly available right in the American federal and state courts. No other country
routinely uses juries in civil cases.
• American rules of discovery give wide latitude for
exploration of potentially relevant evidence.
• The American adversary system generally affords
the advocates far greater latitude in presentation
of a case than is customary in other common law
systems. In part, this is because of the use of juries.
• The American system operates through a unique
cost rule. Each party, including a winning party,
ordinarily pays its own lawyer and cannot recover
that expense from a losing opponent. In most
other countries, the winning party, whether plain-
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tiff or defendant, recovers at least a substantial
portion of litigation costs.7
• American judges are selected through a variety of
ways in which political affiliation plays an important part. In most other common law countries,
judges are selected on the basis of professional
standards.
However, it should also be recognized that the procedures in American administrative adjudications, which are
conducted by professional judges without juries, much more
closely resemble their counterparts in other countries.
IV.

RULES

FOR

FORMULATION

OF

CLAIMS (PLEADING)

The rules governing formulation of claims are substantially similar in most legal systems. The pleading requirement
in most common law systems requires that the claimant state
the claim with reasonable particularity as to facts concerning
persons, places, times, and sequences of events involved in the
relevant transaction. This pleading rule is essentially similar to
the Code Pleading requirement that governed in most American states prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.8 The attempt in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to eliminate disputes over pleading through the technique of “notice pleading” has been largely unsuccessful
because it simply postpones disputes concerning the legal sufficiency of a claim until later stages in the litigation. The
Transnational Rules require that pleading be in detail with
particulars as to the basis of claim and that the particulars reveal a set of facts that, if proved, would entitle the claimant to a
judgment.

7. See generally ALAN J. TOMKINS AND THOMAS E. WILLGING, TAXATION OF
ATTORNEY’S FEES: PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL COURTS
(1986). See also, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and
the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966); Thomas D. Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982).
8. Leland L. Tolman, Advisory Committee’s Proposals to Amend the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 40 A.B.A. J. 843, 844 (1954); FLEMING JAMES ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 3.5, 3.6 (4th ed. 1992).
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DISCOVERY

The pleading rule requiring specific allegations of fact
reduces the potential scope of discovery, as it provides for
tightly framed claims and defenses from the very beginning of
the proceeding. Moreover, it contemplates that a party who
has pleaded specific facts will be required to reveal, at a second
stage of the litigation, the specific proof on which it intends to
rely concerning these allegations, including documents, witnesses, and experts. The Rules require disclosure of these
sources of proof prior to the plenary hearing. These requirements presuppose that a party properly may commence litigation only if the claimant has a provable case and not merely
the hope or expectation of uncovering such a case through
discovery from the opposing party.
The combination of strict rules of pleading and compulsory disclosure further reduces the necessity of further exchange of evidence. A party must show its cards, so to speak.
Within that framework, the Rules attempt to define a limited
right of document discovery and a limited right of deposition.
These are regarded as improper in many civil law systems.
However, in a modern legal system, there is a growing practical necessity—if one is serious about justice—to permit document discovery to some extent and, at least in some cases, deposition of key witnesses.
In most common law jurisdictions, pre-trial depositions
are unusual and, in some countries, typically are employed
only when the witness will be unavailable for trial. Documents
are subject to discovery only when relevant to the proceeding.
Relevance for this purpose is defined by reference to the
pleadings in the case and, as noted above, the rules of pleading require full specification of claims and defenses.9 In contrast, wide-ranging pre-trial discovery is an integral part of contemporary American civil litigation, particularly in cases involving substantial stakes.
The rules for document production in the common law
systems all derive from the English Judicature Acts of 1873 and

9. See generally PRE-TRIAL
(Charles Platto ed., 1990).

AND

PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE
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1875.10 In 1888, the standard for discovery was held in the
leading Peruvian Guano decision to cover:
any document that relates to the matters in question
in the action, which not only would be evidence
upon any issue, but also which, it is reasonable to suppose, contains information which may — not which
must — either directly or indirectly enable the
party . . . either to advance his own case or to damage
the case of his adversary . . . [A] document can properly be said to contain information which may enable
the party requiring the affidavit either to advance his
own case or to damage the case of his adversary, if it
is a document which may fairly lead him to a train of
inquiry, which may have either of these two consequences . . . .11
Under the civil law there is no discovery as such. A party
has a right only to request that the court interrogate a witness
or that the court require the opposing party to produce a document. This arrangement is a corollary of the general principle in the civil law system that the court rather than the parties
is in charge of the development of evidence. Moreover, a party
in some civil law systems cannot be compelled to produce a
document that will establish its own liability—a civil equivalent
of a privilege against self-incrimination. However, in many
civil law systems, a party may be compelled to produce a document when the judge concludes that the document is the only
evidence concerning the point of issue. This result also can be
accomplished by holding that the burden of proof as to the
issue shall rest with the party in possession of the document.
In any event, the standard for production under the civil law
uniformly appears to be “relevance” in a fairly strict sense.
VI.

PROCEDURE

AT

PLENARY HEARING

Another principal difference between civil law systems
and common law systems concerns presentation of evidence.
10. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c.66; Supreme
Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c.77.
11. Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v. Peruvian
Guano Co. 11 QBD 55, 63 (1882) (interpreting Order XXXI, rule 12, from
the 1875 Rules of Supreme Court, which required production of documents
“relating to any matters in question in the action”).

\\Server03\productn\N\NYI\33-3\NYI303.txt

778

unknown

Seq: 10

18-MAY-01

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

13:27

[Vol. 33:769

As is well known, judges in civil law systems develop the evidence with suggestions from the advocates, while in common
law systems, the evidence is presented by the advocates with
supervision and supplementation by the judge. Furthermore,
in many civil law systems, the evidence usually is taken in separate stages according to availability of witnesses, while in common law systems, it generally is taken in consecutive hearings
for which the witnesses must adjust their schedules. More fundamentally, the basic conception of the plenary hearing in
civil law systems is that of an inquiry by the judge that is monitored by advocates on behalf of the parties, while the conception of a trial in common law systems is that of juxtaposed
presentations to the court by the parties through their advocates.
In more pragmatic terms, the effectuation of these different conceptions of the plenary hearing requires different professional skills on the part of judges and advocates. An effective judge in the civil law system must be able to frame questions and pursue them in an orderly fashion, and an effective
advocate must give close attention to that questioning and be
alert to suggest additional directions or extensions of the inquiry. In the common law system, the required skills are more
or less the opposite. The common law advocate must be skillful at framing and pursuing questions in orderly sequence,
while the judge must be attentive to pursuing further development by supplemental questions.
VII.

SECOND-INSTANCE REVIEW

AND

FINALITY

The Transnational Rules defer to the law of the forum
concerning second-instance proceedings (“appeal”). The
same is true for further review in a higher court, as is available
in many systems. The Rules define conditions of finality that
discourage the re-opening of an adjudication that has been
completed. A case fairly conducted is the best approximation
of true justice that human enterprise can achieve. On that basis, an adjudication should be left at rest even when there may
be some reason to think that a different result could be
achieved, unless there is a showing of fraud in the proceeding
or of conclusive evidence that was previously undisclosed. The
Rules adopt an approach to finality based on that philosophy.
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THESE RULES

The Rules are designed to express basic principles of civil
procedure recognized in modern societies. They seek to combine the best elements of adversary procedure, particularly
that in the common law tradition, with the best elements of
judge-centered procedure, particularly that in the civil law tradition. They are expressed in terminology and through concepts that can be assimilated in all legal traditions.
The procedure and legal authority for adoption of these
Rules is a matter of the domestic and international law of
states. Hence, these Rules may be adopted by international
convention or by legal authority of a nation state for application in the courts of that state. In countries with a unitary legal system, that legal authority is vested in the national government. In federal systems, the allocation of that authority depends upon the terms of the particular federation. It might
be, for example, that these Rules could be adopted for the
federal courts in a federal system but only as prescribed by the
state or province in the state or provincial courts. As used in
the Rules, “state” refers to a sovereign state and not to a province or state within a federal system.
These Rules could be adopted for use in the first-instance
courts of general competence, in a specialized court, or in a
division of the court of general competence having jurisdiction over commercial disputes.
These Rules could also be approved as Models that could
be adapted to various basic procedural systems.
IX.

PURPOSE

OF

THESE RULES

The objective of these Rules is to offer a system of fair
procedure for litigants involved in legal disputes arising from
transnational transactions. Appreciating that all litigation is
unpleasant from the viewpoint of the litigants, the Rules seek
to reduce the uncertainty and anxiety that particularly attend
parties obliged to litigate in unfamiliar surroundings. The reduction of difference in legal systems, commonly called “harmonization” of law, is an aspect of achieving such fairness.
However, a system of rules is only one aspect of fair procedure.
Much more important, as a practical matter, is the independence and neutrality of judges and the competence and integrity of legal counsel. Nevertheless, rules of procedure are in-
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fluential in the conduct of litigation. These Rules seek to express, so far as rules can do so, the ideal of disinterested
adjudication. As such, they also can be terms of reference in
matters of judicial cooperation, wherein the courts of different
legal systems provide assistance to each other. By the same
token, reference to the principles expressed herein can moderate the unavoidable tendency of practitioners in a legal system, both judges and lawyers, to consider their system from a
parochial viewpoint.
The Rules herein, governing presentation of claims, development and presentation of legal argument, and the final
determination by the tribunal (Rules 11 through 33), may be
adopted or referenced in proceedings not otherwise governed
by these Rules, particularly arbitration.
These Rules are proposed for adoption by states to govern
litigation arising from transnational business, commercial, or
financial transactions, as defined in Rule 2. The method of
adoption could be treaty, convention or other international
agreement, or statute or rule of court of a state or political
subdivisions thereof. A court could refer to these Rules as generally recognized standards of civil justice when doing so is not
inconsistent with its own organic or procedural law. It is contemplated that, when adopted, these Rules would be a special
form of procedure applicable to these transactions, similar to
specialized procedural rules that most states have for bankruptcy, administration of decedents’ estates, and civil claims
against government agencies.
Where permissible by forum law, these Rules could also
be adopted through contractual stipulation by parties to govern, with the consent of the forum, litigation arising from a
contractual relationship. This form of implementation in substance is a party stipulation to waive the otherwise governing
rules of procedure in favor of these Rules.
X.

REVISIONS

FROM

PRIOR DRAFTS

Prior drafts of the Rules have been published.12 These
drafts, together with the previous Discussion Draft No. 1 and
12. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michelle Taruffo, Transnational Rules of
Civil Procedure: Rules and Commentary, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 495 (1997);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Michele Taruffo, Transnational Rules of Civil Pro-
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Preliminary Draft No. 2, have elicited valuable criticism and
comments from legal scholars and lawyers from both civil and
common law systems.13 Comparison will demonstrate that
cedure, Preliminary Draft No. 1, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 499 (1998) [hereinafter Hazard and Taruffo, Preliminary Draft No. 1].
13. See, more recently, Rolf Stürner, Règles Transnationales de Procédure Civile?
Quelques Remarques d’un Européen sur un Nouveau Projet Commun de l’American
Law Institute et d’UNIDROIT, R.I.D.C 845 (2000); Rolf Stürner, Some European
Remarks on a New Joint Project of The American Law Institute and UNIDROIT, 34
INT’L LAW. 1071 (2000); Antonio Gidi, Presentación del Proyecto de Normas
Transnacionales del Proceso Civil, 52 DERECHO PUC 607 (1999); Antonio Gidi,
Normas Transnacionais de Processo Civil, 8 REVISTA DOS MESTRANDOS EM
DIREITO ECONÔMICO DA UFBA 54 (2000); José Lebre de Freitas, O Anteprojecto
Hazard-Taruffo para o Processo dos Litı́gios Comerciais Internacionais, 2 THEMIS.
REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA 19
(2000); Eduard Kuns̆tek, Transnacionalna Pravila Gradanskog Postupka, 21
ZBORNIK PRAVNOG FAKULTETA SVEUÈILIS̆TA U RIJECI 351 (2000); Antonio Gidi,
Apresentação às Normas Transnacionais de Processo Civil, 8 REVISTA DOS MESTRANDOS EM DIREITO ECONÔMICO DA UFBA 40 (2000), also published in 52
DERECHO PUC 593 (1999); Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, Improving the Prospects of the Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure Project: Some
Thoughts on Purpose and Means of Implementation, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL (2000), also published in 18 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV.
(2000); Samuel P. Baumgartner, Gaining a Worldly Perspective for the World in
Our Courts (unpublished manuscript, on file with the American Law Institute); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Litigio Civil Sin Fronteras: Armonización y Unificación del Derecho Procesal, 52 DERECHO PUC 583 (1999); Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Civil Litigation Without Frontiers: Harmonization and Unification of Procedural
Law, 52 DERECHO PUC 575 (1999).
See also Gary B. Born, Critical Observations on the Draft Transnational Rules
of Civil Procedure, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 387 (1998); Russell J. Weintraub, Critique
of the Hazard-Taruffo Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J.
413 (1998); Jacob Dolinger and Carmen Tiburcio, Which Procedural Law Governs Proceedings to Be Performed in Foreign Jurisdictions: Lex Fori or Lex Diligentiae?, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 425 (1998); Gerhard Walter and Samuel P. Baumgartner, Utility and Feasibility of Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure: Some German and Swiss Reactions to the Hazard-Taruffo Project, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463
(1998); Catherine Kessedjian, First Impressions of the Transnational Rules of
Civil Procedure, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 477 (1998); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and
Michele Taruffo, Preliminary Draft No. 1, supra note 12; Michele Taruffo,
Drafting Rules for Transnational Litigation, 110 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS
449 (1997), Barceló, supra note 6, at 493.
For the previous drafts, we received written contributions from Mathew
Applebaum, Stephen Burbank, Edward Cooper, Stephen Goldstein, Richard
Hulbert, J. A. Jolowicz, Dianna Kempe, Mary Kay Kane, Ramón Mullerat,
Ernesto Penalva, Thomas Pfeiffer, Hans Rudolf Steiner, Rolf Stürner, Louise
Teitz, Janet Walker, Gerhard Walter, Garry Watson, Des Williams, and
others.
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many modifications have been adopted as a result of discussions and deliberations following those previous publications,
especially revision of the provisions on scope, composition of
the tribunal, the incorporation of “principles of interpretation,” the sequence and scope of exchange of evidence, specification of a settlement-offer procedure, and provisions for
special courts for transnational litigation, for amendment of
pleadings, and for procedures for dealing with multiple parties
or multiple claims. The net effect can be described as a new
text.
Earlier drafts of the Rules were translated into German by
Gerhard Walter from Bern University; into Japanese by Koichi
Miki from Keio University; into French by Gabriele Mecarelli
from Paris University; into Chinese by Terence Lau; into Italian by Francesca Cuomo and Valentina Riva from Pavia University; into Croatian by Eduard Kuns̆tek; into Spanish by
Evaluz Cotto from Puerto Rico University, Franciso Malaga
from Pompeu Fabra University, Anı́bal Quiroga León from
Catholic University of Peru, Horácio Segundo Pinto from the
Catholic University of Argentina, and Lorena Bachmaier from
Universidad Complutense de Madrid; and into Portuguese by
Associate Reporter Antonio Gidi from the University of Pennsylvania. It is hoped that there will be translations into additional languages in the future.
In addition to making numerous changes to the Rules,
this new draft contains, more significantly, for the first time
Fundamental Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure.
The inclusion of the Principles constitutes a revision of the
project suggested by the International Institute for the UnifiFor the preceding draft, we received written contributions from Robert
Byer, Robert Casad, Edward Cooper, José Lebre de Freitas, Richard Hulbert,
Mary Kay Kane, Richard Marcus, Michael Stamp, Tom Rowe, and Ralph
Whitten.
For this draft, we received written comments to the Principles from Robert Barker, Stephen Burbank, Michael Cohen, Edward Cooper, Frédérique
Ferrand, Stephen Goldstein, Richard Hulbert, Mary Kay Kane, Dianna
Kempe, Donald King, Anthony Jolowicz, Stephen McEwen, Jr., Tom Rowe,
Amos Shapira, Laurel Terry, and Diane Wood.
We received written comments to the Rules from Robert Bone, Michael
Cohen, Thomas F. Cope, Frédérique Ferrand, José Lebre de Freitas, Trevor
Hartley, Mary Kay Kane, Donald King, Houston Putnam Lowry, Richard
Marcus, Natalie Thingelstad, Lawrence Newman, William Reynolds, Janet
Walker, Garry Watson, and Ralph Whitten.
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cation of Private Law (UNIDROIT), in which The American
Law Institute has happily concurred. The numerous revisions
of the Rules emerged from discussions at several locations with
Advisers from various countries, including meetings in
Bologna and Rome, Italy; Vancouver, Canada; San Francisco,
Washington, and Philadelphia, United States; Vienna, Austria;
Tokyo, Japan; Singapore; and Paris, France. Criticism and discussion also were conducted through correspondence.
The project was the subject of extensive commentary and
much candid and helpful criticism at an October 27, 2000,
meeting of French proceduralists in Paris, in which participants included Judges Guy Canivet, Jacques Lemontey, and
Jean Buffet and Professors Bernard Audit, Georges Bolard,
Loı̈c Cadiet, Philippe Fouchard, Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon,
Serge Guinchard, Catherine Kessedjian, Pierre Mayer, Horatia
Muir-Watt, Marie-Laure Niboyet, Jacques Normand, and
Claude Reymond.
It is hoped that this long process of dialogue has made
the Principles and Rules more understandable and therefore
more acceptable from both common law and civil law perspectives.
XI.

UNIDROIT PARTNERSHIP

Since 2000, after a favorable report from Professor Rolf
Stürner, UNIDROIT joined the American Law Institute (ALI)
in this project. It was at UNIDROIT’s initiative that the preparation of Fundamental Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure was undertaken. The Fundamental Principles will inform the interpretation of the Rules, the more detailed body
of procedural law. The project thus now encompasses both
levels.
The Principles generally appeal to the civil law mentality.
Common law lawyers may be less familiar with this sort of generalization and abstraction. Since the Principles and Rules are
being developed simultaneously, the relation between generality and specification is illuminated more sharply. The Principles are interpretive guides to the Rules and could be adopted
as principles of interpretation. They could also be adopted as
guidelines in interpreting existing national codes of procedure. Correlatively, the Rules can be considered as an exemplification of the Principles.
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During May 22-26, 2000, the ALI/UNIDROIT Working
Group had a preliminary meeting in the UNIDROIT Headquarters in Rome. In this meeting, three proposals for Principles were extensively discussed. One was presented by Reporters Hazard, Taruffo, and Gidi, another by Reporter Rolf Stürner, and another by Neil Andrews of the Working Group. The
group also extensively discussed the previous draft of the
Transnational Rules. The current draft is the result of that
meeting.
XII.

FUTURE WORK

The Reporters are preparing Annotations that will correlate the provisions of these Rules with cognate provisions in
various national-procedural systems.
This Discussion Draft is still a “work in progress.” An intensive discussion of the Principles and Rules is to be held at
UNIDROIT headquarters in Rome during July 2-6, 2001. We
expect to have discussions of these texts in the coming year in
China, Japan, Latin America, and Europe. We expect to present a further revision to the Institute sometime in the next
year or two.
Subsequent drafts will incorporate the latest revisions of
these Rules. The latest version will be accessible at The American Law Institute’s website (http://www.ali.org/ali/transrules.htm).
The Reporters welcome suggestions and criticisms. Our
address is as follows:
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
4025 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-3099
Telecopier: (215) 243-1636
E-mail: transrules@ali.org

